

Message Text

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ADP000

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ACTION SS-30

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 5900

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE SOVIET DRAFT WOULD LIMIT HEAVY BOMBERS TO AGREED, BUT UNSPECIFIED, LEVELS. WHILE THEY HAVE DROPPED THEIR EARLIER DEMAND FOR THE COMPLETE DENUCLEARIZATION OF BOMBERS, THEIR DRAFT PROPOSED TO BAN NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES ON BOMBERS. THIS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY LIMITATION ON AIR DEFENSES.

THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT ALSO DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY FREEDOM-TO-MIX, WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION. FURTHERMORE, THEIR DRAFT RELEGATES THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS TO THE PREAMBLE AND EVEN THERERELATES IT TO THE FAR DISTANT GOAL OF "GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT."

THE SOVIET DRAFT ALSO PROVIDES THAT, BEGINNING FROM AN AGREED DATE, NEITHER SIDE WOULD DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY:

- (A) SUBMARINES OF A NEW GENERATION, ARMED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES;
- (B) NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS;
- (C) LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES;
- (D) INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES;
- (E) SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES;
- (F) STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS AND ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES);

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(G) FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEA-BED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND IN-LAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDING THAT EACH SIDE NOT DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SUBMARINES OF A NEW GENERATION, ARMED WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES, OR NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, WOULD PROHIBIT THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE AND B-1 BOMBER PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. HOWEVER, AS DRAFTED, IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE SOVIETS' DELTA-CLASS SUBMARINE OR BACKFIRE BOMBER PROGRAMS. YOU WILL NOTE THAT, BY MAKING NO MENTION OF ICBMS IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WOULD IN NO WAY INHIBIT THEIR OWN VIGOROUS ICBM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR PROPOSALS ON LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND STRATEGIC SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES, THEY HAVE DEFINED THESE AS MISSILES HAVING A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM.

A NEW ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET DRAFT IS A PROVISION PROPOSING THE LIMITATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON ICBMS AND SLBMS TO AN "AGREED PORTION OF THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF THESE MISSILES" PERMITTED TO EACH SIDE. NEITHER THE SOVIET DRAFT NOR THEIR SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS HAVE PROVIDED CLARIFICATION OF THIS KEY PHRASE.

THE SOVIET DRAFT CALLS FOR THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. "FORWARD-BASED" NUCLEAR SYSTEMS DEPLOYED WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF WHAT THEY CALL "CORRESPONDING BASES", ALL WITHIN A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL BEYOND AGREED LIMITS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WITH NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT AND FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF FORWARD SUBMARINE BASES IN THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. THERE IS NO MENTION OF THEIR OWN NON-CENTRAL NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS. WE HAVE REITERATED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT SUCH A PROVISION WOULD WORK BASIC CHANGES IN REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCES, BUT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WHICH BOUGHT ABOUT THE DEFENSIVE OBLIGATIONS EARLIER ASSUMED. THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY

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INTERESTS OF THE U.S. IN A PATENTLY INEQUITABLE MANNER.

ON THE QUESTION OF NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NOT COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, THE SOVIET DRAFT CONTAINS A PROVISION PROVIDING FOR DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION OF SUCH

ARMS AS THEY EMERGE.

ON THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER, THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT
READS:

"1. TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS AGREE-
MENT EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TRANSFER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS TO OTHER STATES AND NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH ARMS ON THEIR
TERRITORY.

2. EACH PARTY ALSO UNDERTAKES NOT TO PROVIDE TO OTHER
STATES TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
SPECIALLY WORKED OUT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS LIMITED BY THIS AGREEMENT.

3. EACH PARTY ASSUMES THE OBLIGATION NOT TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS
WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES."

IN SUMMARY, THE SOVIET DRAFT SETS FORTH A MAXIMUM IN-GOING
POSITION WHICH OBVIOUSLY HAS BUILT INTO IT CONSIDERABLE TRADING
ROOM AND POSITIONS FROM WHICH THEY COULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF
FAILING BACK WITHOUT MAKING SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS.
YOU CAN APPRECIATE THAT AT THIS TIME I AM NOT IN A POSITION
TO ANTICIPATE OUR NEXT STEP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWEVER, I HAVE INFORMED THE SOVIET CHIEF NEGOTIATOR THAT THE
SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT FAILS TO MEET THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF RE-
COGNITION OF EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.
I HAVE FURTHER ADVISED HIM THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY
REACTION TO THE SOVIET DRAFT IS NEGATIVE, AND THAT WE ARE
PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED BY ITS ONE-SIDEDNESS.
WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED
OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS. JOHNSON

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